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The post-apartheid South African context has given rise to much scholarship grappling with 
the issues of how to conceptualize racism in contemporary – and particularly transitional - 
societies. The question of theorizing new and distinctive modalities of racism is a priority 
both for anti-racism activists and for those interested in the political uses of psychological 
theory. This being the case, a text by a leading South African social psychologist that 
promises a novel approach to ‘race trouble’ has much to offer to an international audience.  
Race Trouble is an impressive and timely book. It makes a vital contribution to the 
study of racialising practices, synthesizing, as it does, a cross-section of different social 
psychological approaches so as to develop an original response to the political contingencies 
of post-apartheid South Africa. Three further aspects of the book deserve particular 
commendation: the fluent survey it offers of the most promising tools available within social 
psychology; the wonderful use of illustrative devices (textual extracts from recent research, 
incisive examples drawn from popular culture); and an awareness of the reductive 
shortcomings of psychological reifications of the supposedly “internal” mechanisms of 
individual racism. Even more important than these merits is the book’s fidelity to the 
context it describes. So, although the authors draw on a variety of important sources – 
including Omi & Winant’s (1994) notion of ‘racial formations’ and Essed’s influential (1991) 
idea of ‘everyday racism’ – there is a constant awareness that these conceptualizations 
cannot be uncritically incorporated into an analysis of the post-apartheid situation. 
 It is precisely this attention to the vicissitudes of historical location that grounds the 
book’s most provocative argument. This argument concerns the idea that despite its 
longstanding political importance the time now is ripe to move beyond a social 
psychological analysis of racism, to the more nuanced possibilities of an analysis of race 
trouble. Given that such a claim will no doubt attract much by way of criticism, it is 
important that we attend to the particularity of the authors’ arguments. Indeed, why should 
we move away from the concept of racism, which brings with it such an established critical 
heritage, along with many varied registers of analysis (which enable us to grapple with 
racism in combinations of its institutional, discursive, inter-subjective and psychological 
manifestations)? Well, in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, say the authors, it is no 
longer clear “who is responsible for the persistence of racial segregation and inequality, the 
charge of racism no longer serves to separate oppressor and oppressed in any simple way” 
(p. 23). This, for many, remains more of a debatable point than a demonstrable reality. 
More contentious yet is the assertion that “white racism is no longer the major problem in 
intergroup relations in South Africa today” (p. 63), a comment that will no doubt occasion 
much by way of dissent. Perhaps harder to dispute is the idea that in today’s South Africa 
solidarity across racial lines is no longer adequate to address the perpetuation of economic 
inequality. As such, the notion of non-racism “no longer serves as a unifying concept under 
which to wage a struggle for transformation” (p. 16), “inequality within race groups is now 
more extreme than inequality between groups” (p. 17). 
I am perhaps less inclined than Durrheim, Mtose and Brown to do away with the 
notion of racism altogether as a tool of critical analysis. That being said, I am in agreement 
with the authors that the flat-footed utilization of this concept can sometimes block more 
textured, multifaceted types of social analysis, particularly in stances when race is 
inextricably intertwined with sexuality, ethnicity, class, gender etc. – a point already 
established by theorists of ‘intersectionality’. It is when Durrheim, Mtose and Brown stress 
the social complexities that are potentially lost in this way, when the notion of racism is 
wielded as a blunt meta-narrative obscuring other dimensions of social critique - that their 
argument takes on its most compelling form. “Accusations of racism serve blaming 
functions, take sides with one perspective over others, and gloss over these complex and 
diverse forms of subjectivity, reducing them to a universal binary: racist or not” (p. 201). 
Furthermore: “Surely, the nuance, subtlety and particularity we find in the architecture and 
choreography of racial practices will be lost by lumping all of these different formations into 
one large epoch or by applying the label ‘modern racism’” (p. 200). However, if “charges of 
racism…produce [the] conflicting lines of social fracture that are [themselves] the proper 
object of social analysis” (p. 2), then it would seem that the validity of the above critique has 
much to do with an assessment of what this suggested ‘proper object’, that of ‘race 
trouble’, is. 
How then is ‘race trouble’ defined? Early on in the book ‘race trouble’ is introduced 
as “a social psychological condition that emerges when the history of racism infiltrates the 
present to unsettle social order, arouse conflict of perspectives and create situations that 
are individually and collectively troubling” (p. 27). Toward the end of the book ‘race trouble’ 
is described as the “positioning of subjects in racially aligned practices of engagement and 
conflict” (p. 194), as “dynamic and mutually constitutive practices and contexts of social 
division” (p. 199). What quickly becomes apparent then is that Durrheim, Mtose and 
Brown’s objective is not to turn a blind eye to racism. Quite the contrary, the idea of ‘race 
trouble’ hopes precisely to alert us to the myriad ways in practices of racialization - 
segregation, discrimination, exclusion and so on - are still operative, even if they no longer 
follow the clear-cut hierarchical or – to borrow from Fanon – ‘Manichean’ terms in which 
‘white’ and ‘black’ are mutually-exclusive, internally-consistent categories. “An analysis of 
race trouble can be distinguished from an analysis of racism as a bottom-up, as opposed to 
top-down, approach…from our bottom-up perspective we are interested in studying the 
practices, acts of division and reactions that constitute race trouble” (p. 30).  
One question which emerges here is whether the type of analysis that the authors 
are advocating, that is, one attuned to further complexities and ambiguities within regimes 
of racializing practice, has not already been advanced within social theory? Postcolonial 
critics such as Homi Bhabha (1994) have long since insisted on a more ambiguous and 
polyvalent set of ‘inter-racial’ relations (and, indeed, identifications) than could be grasped 
through the use of simple binary oppositions. A question then to the authors: have the best 
conceptualizations of racism not always included an awareness of ‘race trouble’, at least in 
the sense that they have been attentive to the multiple lines of social fracture of which 
racism is part? This would seem a necessary consideration in contexts beyond the extreme 
racial polarizations of apartheid and/or colonial racism. Indeed, for Marxist and feminist 
scholars, as in the case of theorists of intersectionality, ‘racism’ has, in and of itself, never 
been an adequate basis of substantive social analysis. We could develop this line of critique 
in another way. If ‘race trouble’ entails within it an awareness of ongoing racist practices – 
even if thoroughly attenuated and diffused through other types of power-relation – then 
surely it is not the notion of racism itself that is the problem. Is it not rather that it is ‘bad’ 
analyses of racism that is the root trouble here, analyses, in other words, that are 
insufficiently attentive to other necessarily linked factors of social division? 
A further important issue comes to the fore here. What is potentially lost in 
substituting the overtly political and ethical agendas associated with the critique of racism, 
to the less obviously political considerations of race trouble? The argument could be made – 
contrary no doubt to the objectives of the authors – that the race trouble notion links less 
clearly to a social justice imperative than to the task of avoiding various forms of discomfort 
occasioned by the practices of racialization with which we are (knowingly or unknowingly) 
complicit. In this respect one should be attentive to how the authors justify and substantiate 
the ‘race trouble’ concept. Particularly noticeable here is the language of affect which 
sneaks into such descriptions. Take the following example: “People feel troubled by race. 
They feel attacked, undermined, threatened, and they respond with irritation, anger and 
hostility” (p. 27). Or, in an earlier passage: 
We often come away from situations and encounters with a sense of unease, 
fear or suspicion, wondering whether our actions or treatment by others was 
influenced by race…this racialisation of social life is deeply troubling…[…]…We 
usually prefer not to speak or think about race. We are scared of causing offence 
or social disruption. What is troubling is not the racialisation per se, but the 
persistent questioning of whether or not race is pertinent (p. 24). 
Of course for many racialisation, which invariably takes on a discriminatory and evaluative 
element, is itself profoundly troubling. To suggest otherwise, is perhaps only to confirm that 
the goal of properly political critique has become something of a secondary priority. There 
are at least two prospective problems that follow from the above recourse to the types of 
emotional discord characterizing race trouble. Firstly – as already noted - there is the risk of 
giving the impression that race trouble is troubling primarily because it is psychologically 
disruptive. This is a worrisome implication; it is all too easily read as a depoliticization of 
racialization. It is worth making a comparison here with the notion of ‘gender trouble’ as 
Judith Butler (1990) uses the term. ‘Gender trouble’ for her concerns a calling into question 
of the gendered subject. ‘Troubling’ here points to a dissipation of what had hitherto been 
considered substantive identities of gender. The troubling of the subject is not thus a 
problem. More importantly perhaps, the troubled subject is not the basis of any conceptual 
justification of the type of analysis Butler goes on to conduct. Her work thus sidesteps the 
prospective dilemma that Durrheim, Mtose and Brown face, namely that of unintentionally 
recuperating the psychological subject. 
The second potential problem alluded to above concerns the emphasis on the 
anxieties set in play by racialization. This seems somewhat misplaced in a text that is deeply 
mistrustful of affective explanations of racism. What becomes apparent in fact is a 
conspicuous absence in the book’s otherwise impressive engagement with the social 
psychological dynamics of race trouble: the lack of a developed engagement with the 
affective dimension of such phenomena. This then is the quandary: the race trouble concept 
itself seems necessarily to imply the quality of affective disturbance – something often 
apparent in the textual materials cited by the authors - but affect itself is never explicitly 
theorized as such. 
The reason that the authors are so elusive when it comes to questions of affect is 
that they are committed to a mode of conceptualization that views processes of 
racialisation as “distributed across society in new, complex and fluid ways [such that they] 
cannot be…easily pinned down to fixed individuals or groups” (p. 25). In view of the latter 
objective, and certainly against the tendency to locate racism in any type of a ‘depth 
psychology’, they are most certainly right. The subsequent challenge though surely seems to 
involve thinking affective formations that are both reproduced by and that underpin 
racializing practices, and to do so in a distributed manner which avoids the pitfalls of 
individualizing (or depth) psychological notions. There are available guidelines for such an 
approach, certainly so within those texts of cultural and social theory which aim to deploy 
non-reductive (and non-individualizing) analyses of the affective economies of racism. Take 
for example Ahmed (2004) approach in The Cultural Politics of Emotion. “[In] an analysis of 
affective economies” she argues, “feelings do not reside in subjects or objects, but are 
produced as effects of circulation” (p. 8). “[F]eelings”, she continues, take “a form of social 
presence rather than a self-presence”, emotions thus create “the very effect of the surfaces 
and boundaries that allow us to distinguish an inside and an outside…emotions are not 
simply something ‘I’ or ‘we’ have” (p 10). This means, that  
’the subject’ is simply one nodal point in [an affective] economy, rather than its 
origin and destination”, that the “sideways and backwards movement of 
emotions such as hate (p. 46). 
The authors are perhaps less far off from such conceptualizations than they realize, certainly 
in view of how they, like Ahmed, wish to avoid reifying both the psychological subject and 
intra-psychic terms of analyses. This returns us to one of the stand-out accomplishments of 
the book: the wonderful set of exemplifications it provides of Billig’s (1999) notion of 
‘Freudian repression’. Billig’s aim is to describe a repression as a jointly-managed rhetorical 
accomplishment; this is repression as it exists on the surface of the spoken word, without 
any reliance on the dynamics of a depth-psychology model. As they so nicely put it - in terms 
that unexpectedly invoke the Lacanian notion of an ‘external’ unconscious that becomes 
apparent in the instance of speech - 
it is possible for an audience to hear in…expression[s] things other than what the 
speaker wants to intend – even things that may be socially unacceptable. This 
possibility of unintended hearing arises for the dual reason that all expressions 
leave some things unsaid and what is said can be understood in more than one 
way…Expressions do not exhaust the possibility of their meaning (pp. 174-175). 
This important attention to repression as a distributed phenomenon is later complemented 
by means of reference to Butler’s notions of performativity – something well overdue in 
social psychological texts. The value of this explanatory frame is that it assumes “no 
gendered self behind the scenes directing activity”, and as such “All we have are people 
engaged in discursive and embodied activities” (p. 142). In reference to Harré the claim is 
made that “there is no pre-existing personality or self”, “attributes of self - desires, 
intentions, thoughts, feelings and so on – are the outcome of activity” (p. 143).  
So far, so good: social routines contain and produce subjects. As we are informed 
later in the same chapter, in reference to the analysis of spatio-discursive topographies of 
beach-going behaviour, talk and actions are mutually reinforcing. Segregationist practices 
exhibit a type of “recursivity between subjectivity and social life…[the] identity and talk [of 
beachgoers]…refer to and reflect ongoing patterns of segregation…a recursive self-
producing process whereby racial orders are reproduced and maintained” (p. 161). True as 
all this no doubt is, a problem emerges in viewing the affective dimension of all these 
behaviours as simply a bi-product of such procedures. We may agree that affects certainly 
do arise in relation to social and discursive patterns. Furthermore, we need remain wary of 
crediting affects with an autonomy or agency exceeding the symbolic frame within which 
they emerge. That being said, it is nonetheless true that affects bring with them the 
potential for breaking the mutually-reinforcing patterns of talk and practice discussed 
above.  
The problem with such explanations – where little if anything stands outside the self-
reproducing mechanisms of discursive interpellation – is that it becomes difficult to imagine 
what might successfully disrupt the efficacy of this ideological system. So, when the authors 
suggest that “Social change require[s]… the development of an alternative ideological 
tradition and way of being…[a] new historical subject” (p. 146), one is fully warranted in 
asking what additional factor would be required in order for this to happen. Two 
subsequent examples are provided of the ‘subject of resistance as historical product’: Rosa 
Parks and Steve Biko. Of course, as much as Parks and Biko clearly were historical subjects,  
they were also somehow able to step outside of their allocated ‘subject-positions’ and 
challenge the  racist socio-historical order in which they found themselves. Parks is 
described as “resisting oppression, an act that required courage…a new way of acting” (p. 
147); Biko’s famous declaration in invoked, namely that “[we must] make the black man 
come to himself…infuse him with pride and dignity” (p. 147). The common denominator 
here, which exceeds the idea of resistance as “historical product” is clear enough to see: it is 
the political importance precisely of affect, be it courage, dignity, or in certain formulations 
of black consciousness, love itself. My argument is no doubt clear: a notion of affect is 
deployed here to do explanatory work – slipped in alongside recourse to the historical 
subject - but it is not adequately integrated into the otherwise impressive analytical frame 
the authors have developed. More pointedly yet, to think affect here as epiphenomenon, to 
leave it un-theorized is to miss something crucial about the agency of historical change that 
is here presumed rather than adequately accounted for. This elision of affect links to 
another issue: if the notion of repression is utilized, it surely raised the question of why 
repression is occasioned in the first place? Jointly enacted rhetorical strategies may certainly 
play their part in the sociality of repression, as might given social norms and regulations of 
politeness. Surely though what really sets the mechanics of repression in motion is some or 
other type of affect – (social) anxieties of what is embarrassing, compromising, taboo, 
humiliating, or indeed, painful? 
In conclusion then, the authors have assembled a grid of analysis suitable to the task 
of apprehending various facets of ‘race trouble’ – a concept which despite its depoliticizing 
potential does open up the analytical field in a new and exciting way. They are likewise to be 
commended for the multiple analytical frames that they manage to integrate in Race 
Trouble. There is inspiration to be found in the joint utilization of such ideas (recitation, 
performativity, distributed repression, spatio-discursive practices, habitus, to name only a 
few). The psychological and structural analysis of racism has much to learn from such hybrid 
combinations. The missing piece in this otherwise impressive ensemble of analytical frames 
– and here one can identify an imperative for the contemporary psychological analysis of 
racism more generally - is an analysis of the role of racializing affects in race trouble. 
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